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Legislating Inclusion
Lia Epperson*
[Slegregation now ... segregation tomorrow ... segregation forever.**
The past is never dead. It's not even past.***
INTRODUCTION
This article seeks to situate recent jurisprudence on the Constitution's
commitment to ending racial segregation in public education in the frame-
work of congressional power to enact enforcement legislation. In previous
work, I have examined jurisprudential shifts in recognizing the right to ra-
cially integrated education.' In recent jurisprudence, a majority of the Su-
preme Court identified a substantive equality right to eliminate persistent
racial isolation and inequality in public education. Specifically, in his
sharply worded concurrence in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District,2 Justice Anthony Kennedy found that a "compelling
government interest exists in avoiding racial isolation" and that school dis-
tricts may choose to pursue this interest.3 Kennedy, with the implicit en-
dorsement of the four dissenting Justices, focused on the broader
constitutional ideal of fostering racial inclusion in our nation's schools and
highlighted the continued relevance of integration to the promise articulated
in Brown v. Board of Education.4
Existing jurisprudential avenues to address current constitutional viola-
tions, however, are limited by the modern anti-classification framework used
in adjudicating equal protection claims.5 I suggest that political branches
may have more institutional strength, expertise, flexibility, and enforcement
* Associate Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. B.A.
Harvard College; J.D. Stanford Law School. I appreciate the comments of Michelle Adams,
Taunya Lovell Banks, Elise Boddie, Mark Graber, and Darren Hutchinson on earlier versions.
** Governor George C. Wallace, The 1963 Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1963), available at
http://www.archives.state.al.us/govs list/inauguralspeech.html.
* WIiI1AM FAUI KNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN (1951).
See Lia Epperson, Equality Dissonance: Jurisprudential Limitations and Legislative Op-
portunities, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 213 (2011) (examining the doctrinal restraints imposed by
the Supreme Court's recent educational equality cases and encouraging legal scholars and ad-
vocates to consider congressional solutions to remaining structural racial disparities in
education).
2 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
' Id. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial
isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to
pursue.").41d. at 788 (referencing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
5 See, e.g., Epperson, Equality Dissonance, supra note 1, at 108 (arguing that the anti-
classification model is grounded in the ideal of a "colorblind constitution," which examines
with equal suspicion racial classifications aimed at preserving and perpetuating racial subordi-
nation and those aimed at remedying past discrimination).
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power to pursue racial inclusion in public education.6 Specifically, I propose
that Congress, via Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, should delineate
equal protection remedies to address the unique and enduring dilemma of
twenty-first century racial isolation and resulting inequality in public educa-
tion. 7 Though the Supreme Court has issued a series of opinions narrowing
congressional power to enact enforcement legislation in recent years, no
decisions have addressed congressional enforcement power to legislate at the
distinctive intersection of racial equality and educational opportunity.
This article proceeds in four parts. Part I posits Congress has the au-
thority to enact enforcement legislation to alleviate racial isolation in public
education. Part II closely examines the scope and contours of congressional
enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by ana-
lyzing constitutional text and recent Court interpretations of equality and
enforcement power. Such analysis highlights Congress's unique power to
craft legislation alleviating de facto racial segregation 9 and isolation in pub-
lic schools, institutions integral to shaping our democracy and preparing stu-
dents to be effective citizens. Part III acknowledges potential judicial
constraints posed by the current Court, which underscore the importance of
legislative imperatives. Finally, Part IV draws from these doctrinal argu-
ments to offer preliminary considerations on optimal statutory design. I of-
fer some suggestions that may help bridge the divide between our
constitutional ideals and the practice of facilitating racial inclusion in public
education.
I. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY TO ENACT LEGISLATION TO FOSTER
RACIALLY INCLUSIVE PUBLIC EDUCATION
Congress's constitutional authority to enact legislation fostering racially
inclusive public education can take many forms. Theoretically, such con-
gressional power can be found in a number of constitutional provisions, in-
cluding the Thirteenth Amendment and the Spending") and Commerce
Clauses of Article I. In 1964, Congress famously used its power under the
Commerce Clause to enact the Civil Rights Act.1 Rather than cloaking the
61Id.
71 have also argued in earlier work that the desegregative remedy articulated by the judi-
ciary ultimately proved too crude an instrument to address the complex task of "true integra-
tion," or integration that includes holistic measures to ensure all students receive the myriad
potential short- and long-term benefits of inclusive educational environments. See Lia B. Ep-
person, True Integration: Advancing Brown's Goal ojEducational Equity in the Wake of Grut-
ter, 67 U. PITT. L. Ryv. 175 (2005).
8 See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
De facto racial segregation refers to segregation that is not mandated by the state.
1o While not strictly viewed as civil rights legislation, Congress passed the No Child Left
Behind Act pursuant to its Spending Clause powers.
11 Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
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legislation in equality and dignity language, an emphasis on congressional
commerce power grounded the legislation in such concerns as whether Afri-
can Americans would be inconvenienced if they traveled across state lines. 12
Thus, to ensure a constitutional remedy for private discrimination, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 sacrificed its grounding in notions of equality. Yet, as
Justice Goldberg stated in his concurrence in Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States,3 the "primary purpose" of the 1964 Civil Rights Act "is the
vindication of human dignity and not mere economics." 14
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, conversely, is the legislative
power that is precisely designed to vindicate human dignity and equality. As
such, I argue that Section 5 provides the best means for enacting legislation
aimed at reducing racial isolation in education. While practical expediency
may have necessitated the use of congressional commerce power in the case
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 5 congressional action to enforce race-con-
scious legislation in the domain of schools should not, and need not, take
that path.'6 Such legislation should be grounded in the language of equality
rather than masking the essence of the constitutional entitlement it seeks to
protect. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment serves as the best demo-
cratic tool to carry out the judicial expression of equality.
In addition, such proposed legislation would address the intersection of
fundamental racial inequality and educational opportunity. While the Court
has not found an explicit fundamental right to education under the Equal
Protection Clause, education holds a special place of importance in Supreme
Court jurisprudence.' 7 The Court has held that education is the "very foun-
dation of good citizenship"'8 and is critical to sustaining "our political and
cultural heritage."' 9 Indeed, education is integral "in maintaining our basic
12 See, e.g., S. REp. No. 872, at 2371 (1964) ("Discrimination or segregation by establish-
ments dealing with the interstate traveler subjects members of minority groups to hardship and
inconvenience as well as humiliation, and in that way seriously decreases all forms of travel by
those subject to such discrimination.").
" 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
14 Id. at 291-92.
'-'Congress expressed concern that if the Act were to be passed solely under Congress's
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, those provisions of the Act that barred private
discriminatory conduct would be unconstitutional under the Court's ruling in the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (limiting Congress's ability to use its power under the Reconstruction
Amendments to regulate private conduct). For an interesting discussion of the constitutional
dialogue between the judiciary and the political branches in delineating the constitutional
sources of congressional power to pass the 1964 Civil Rights Act, see Joel K. Goldstein, Con-
stitutional Dialogue and the Civil Rights Act oJ 1964, 49 Sr. Louis U. L.J. 1095 (2005). See
also Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1801, 1802-08 (2010).
16 See generally Goldstein, supra note 15.
7 See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 909 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(positing that when the government serves as "educator," it "is engaged in inculcating social
values and knowledge in relatively impressionable young people"). See generally James E.
Ryan, The Supreme Court and Public Schools, 86 VA. L. REV. 1335 (2000) (examining appli-
cation of constitutional principles to schools).
IS Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
'9 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982).
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institutions" and leaves a "lasting impact of its deprivation on the life of the
child."2 Consequently, courts have long upheld significant federal regula-
tion of public schools.2' Moreover, the Court has held that Congress may
exercise its authority under Section 5 to protect myriad rights that do not
find explicit protection in the text of the Constitution. 2  Given that such
legislation would touch upon equality and substantive rights that the Court
has held to be of extraordinary significance, Congress should have expansive
constitutional authority to legislate in this realm. In fact, Congress's Section
5 power should be at its apex when passing legislation to root out the persis-
tent, pervasive malady of racial isolation and segregation and its attendant
educational inequities.
II. THE SCOPE OF ENFORCEMENT POWER
The Reconstruction Amendments 23 represent the nation's commitment
to the protection of individual rights in the wake of the Civil War. In prohib-
iting state infringement of equal protection, the Fourteenth Amendment pro-
vided a constitutional mandate that facilitated the inclusion of African
Americans in the national community. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides Congress with "the power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion," the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.2 4 This Section gave
Congress significant authority to define those individual rights and create the
legislative structure necessary to enforce them. As congressional debates
show, 25 congressional enforcement power was subject to the test outlined in
McCulloch v. Maryland:26 "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
20 Id.
2 See generally Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations ftr a Right to Education
Under the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 Nw.
U. L. REV. 550 (1992) (considering ways in which constitutional jurisprudence has implied a
right to education and supported extensive educational regulation).
22 As Justice Marshall stated in his dissent in San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez:
I would like to know where the Constitution guarantees the right to procreate, or the
right to vote in state elections, or the right to an appeal from a criminal conviction.
These are instances in which, due to the importance of the interests at stake, the
Court has displayed a strong concern with the existence of discriminatory state treat-
ment. But the Court has never said or indicated that these are interests which inde-
pendently enjoy fullblown constitutional protection.
411 U.S. 1, 100 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
24 U.S. CONSi. amend. XIV, § 5.
21 See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of
Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARM. L. REv. 153, 178 n.153 (1997) ("[Slupporters of the Amend-
ment continued to invoke McCulloch in interpreting the reach of Section 5, without any protest
from opponents." (citing 2 Cong. Rec. 414 (1874))).
26 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional."2  Much of this legis-
lative structure focused on the provision and protection of rights to African
Americans. 28 The goal of such enforcement legislation was to ensure that
Congress, rather than the judiciary, be tasked with remedying Reconstruc-
tion Amendment violations. 29
While the Supreme Court restricted the scope of congressional enforce-
ment power in the nineteenth century, citing principles of federalism,"' it
continued to articulate the McCulloch test for congressional enforcement
power.3' In Katzenbach v. Morgan,32 one of the first key Supreme Court
decisions of the twentieth century to examine Congress's Section 5 power,
the Court again voiced an expansive reading of congressional power to pro-
tect fundamental rights and the rights of traditionally excluded groups.3 The
Warren Court found that Section 5 gave Congress the power to legislate for
the "perfect equality of civil rights and equal protection of the laws. '3 4 The
Court explicitly rejected the notion that "an exercise of congressional power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment that prohibits the enforcement of a
state law can only be sustained if the judicial branch determines that the state
law is prohibited by the provisions of the Amendment that Congress sought
to enforce."35 Such a reading would run counter to "congressional resource-
fulness and responsibility" for implementing the Fourteenth Amendment.36
This constitutional enforcement power, particularly in the safeguarding of
rights for minorities, means that Congress can exercise its discretion in de-
termining necessary legislation to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth
27 Id. at 421.
28 Shortly after ratification, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866, declaring all
persons born in the United States "citizens of the United States" and conferring the rights to,
among other things, own property and enter into contracts without racial discrimination. Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (2000). See also An Act to Establish a Bureau
for the Relief of Freedmen and Refugees, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (1865).
29 See Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 535 (1872).
30 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).31 Id. at 13-14, 20.
32 384 U.S. 641 (1996) (holding that Congress, via Section 5, could prohibit the use of a
literacy test, as appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause).
31 Id. at 649 ("By including § 5 the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause.").
34 Id. at 650.
35 Id. at 648.
36 Id.
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Amendment.3 Courts continued to reiterate this expansive understanding of
congressional enforcement power through the 1980s.38
A. The Sea Change of Boerne?
In 1997, however, the Supreme Court decided City of Boerne v. Flo-
res,39 which many perceived to signal a constitutional sea change in the in-
terpretation of the Section 5 power. 4° The Court held that the 1993 Religious
Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA)4I exceeded Congress's Section 5
power.42 Congress enacted RFRA in response to Employment Division v.
Smith, 41 a 1990 Supreme Court opinion that significantly limited the relig-
ious freedom protections historically afforded individuals under the First
Amendment.44 RFRA provided a different interpretation of First Amend-
ment protection for religious freedom, one that comported with the prevail-
ing standard prior to Smith.
In holding RFRA unconstitutional, the Court retreated from its position
in Katzenbach v. Morgan that Congress has independent interpretive author-
" See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (upholding exercise of congres-
sional enforcement power under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment). Courts have treated con-
gressional enforcement power under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as co-
extensive. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 207 n.l (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). In South Carolina, the Court found that Congress had enforcement power to enact
legislation so long as the rights were a "rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibi-
tion of racial discrimination in voting." 381 U.S. at 324. See also City of Rome, 446 U.S. at
175 ("Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the [Civil
War] amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they
contain, and to secure all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the
domain of congressional power." (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879))).
31 See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). In defining
the boundary between congressional remedial power and judicial power to enforce the
Constitution:
Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to enforce [the Equal Protection
Clause], but absent controlling congressional direction, the courts have themselves
devised standards for determining the validity of state legislation or other official
action that is challenged as denying equal protection. The general rule is that legisla-
tion is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the
statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
Id. at 439-40.
39 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
41 See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Benchmarks of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at A 18;
Linda Greenhouse, High Court Voids a Law Expanding Religious Rights, N.Y. TIMEvfS, June 26,
1997, at D24.
41 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4 (2006).
42 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
4' 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
41 In Smith, the Supreme Court overruled the traditional principle, see, e.g., Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963), that facially neutral laws could not be applied to impose
substantial burdens on the free exercise of religion unless the state provided a good reason for
the burden. Instead, the Smith Court upheld state power to deny unemployment compensation
to Native Americans who had taken part in a traditional religious ritual that included the drug
peyote. 494 U.S. at 886-87.
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ity. Instead, the Court distinguished congressional enforcement and inter-
pretive power:
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are inconsistent
with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the sub-
stance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States.
Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause
cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not en-
force a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has
been given the power to "enforce," not the power to determine,
what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what
Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaning-
ful sense, the "provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].."45
To protect the "vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers
and the federal balance, '4 the Court set forth a new test for determining the
constitutionality of Section 5 legislation: "There must be congruence and
proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the
means adopted to that end. '47 Absent such a connection, "legislation may
become substantive in operation and effect. 4
One could interpret the scope and breadth of the Boerne decision less as
a constitutional sea change in the protection of fundamental rights and more
as a response to Congress's explicit reversal of prior judicial constitutional
interpretation. 49 In addition, Boerne may also be distinguished from Katzen-
bach v. Morgan in that, unlike the Voting Rights Act that was at issue in
Morgan, no facts in the passage of RFRA or its historical background indi-
cated a present pattern of discrimination. 5 In highlighting the distinction
between "measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and
measures that make a substantive change in the governing law,"'" the Court
in Boerne recognized that Congress "must have wide latitude" with respect
to measures that are remedial or prophylactic in nature. 52 Indeed, one read-
ing of Boerne suggests its limiting language does not apply to legislation to
enforce voting rights, nor does it apply more broadly to legislation directly
45 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508.
41 Id. at 536.
41 Id. at 508 (italics added).
48 Id. at 520. Practitioners, policymakers, and scores of academic commentators have ex-
pressed concern over a narrowing of congressional authority under Section 5 in part because of
the Court's 1996 pronouncement that Congress may only abrogate states' immunity from suits
in federal court via unequivocal language in legislation passed pursuant to a valid exercise of
Section 5 power. See also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996)
("[N]otwithstanding Congress' clear intent to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity, the
Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress that power."). In Seminole Tribe, the Court
held that congressional power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several states, and with the Indian tribes," under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 did not include
congressional authority to grant federal jurisdiction over an unconsenting state. Id.
49 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 508, 536.
10 Id. at 530.
11 Id. at 519.
52 Id. at 519-20.
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enforcing civil rights for racial minorities. As one federal district court
noted, "the basic concerns animating... Boerne... do not apply to legisla-
tion designed to prevent . . . racial discrimination-the precise evil ad-
dressed by the Civil War Amendments ..... ,5 Consequently, congressional
authority to implement a remedial and prophylactic measure for the reduc-
tion and avoidance of racial isolation in public education should be broad.
Interestingly, the Boerne Court made clear that Congress may go be-
yond the judicial articulation of constitutional rights when enacting legisla-
tion pursuant to Section 5: "Legislation which deters or remedies
constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement
power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconsti-
tutional and intrudes into 'legislative spheres of autonomy previously re-
served to the States.'"54 On its face, this language suggests Congress may
have expansive authority to enact remedial legislation to reduce racial isola-
tion in schools. The Court, however, tempered such language by requiring
"congruence and proportionality" between the prevention or remedying of
an injury and the means adopted. 55 The RFRA, the Court held, provided no
such congruity.
In the five years following Boerne, the Supreme Court continued to
diminish congressional enforcement power under Section 5 in a series of
cases. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regentsf6 United States v. Morrisonf7
and Board of Trustees of University ofAlabama v. Garrett,5 the Court struck
down legislation as beyond the scope of congressional enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. These cases prompted ques-
tions about Section 5's continued viability as a mechanism for practical im-
plementation of constitutional remedies to protect individual rights.59
Interestingly, none of these cases concerned the scope of enforcement legis-
lation aimed at state conduct that affected a suspect class or, like in Boerne,
protected a fundamental value. 61
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents/,1 the Court held that the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, which allowed individuals to seek mon-
etary relief from states for age discrimination, 2 exceeded the scope of Con-
" Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 242-43 (D.D.C.
2008), rev'd and remanded on other grounds sub nom. Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).54 Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
55 Id. at 520.
5' 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
57 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
58 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
59 See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on
Democracy and Civil Rights, 70 U. CIN. L. Rrv. 367 (2002).
60 Although Boerne concerned religious freedom, the nature of the legislation was argua-
bly sui generis. The case concerned congressional power to interpret, not enforce, the provi-
sions of the Fourteenth Amendment. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536.
61 528 U.S. 62 (1999).
62 The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 prohibits an employer from refus-
ing or failing "to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
[Vol. 6
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gress's enforcement power under Section 5. The Court struck down the Act
because it went beyond the scope of congressional enforcement power by
offering heightened protection for age discrimination. Under the equal pro-
tection clause, age is not a suspect classification.63
In United States v. Morrison14 the Court held that the federal Violence
Against Women Act6 5 exceeded Congress's Section 5 power on the ground
that it regulated private conduct.66 While the legislation at issue targeted vio-
lence motivated by gender,6 a quasi-suspect classification, the Court found
Congress had exceeded its Section 5 authority in passing legislation that
targeted private conduct. 6 Similar to the legislation in The Civil Rights
Cases,6" such action is beyond the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While Congress amassed a substantial legislative record documenting "gen-
der-based disparate treatment by state authorities," the Court held that the
legislation failed the Boerne congruence and proportionality test because the
remedy held private individuals, rather than the "culpable state official,"
liable."'
One year later, the Court in Board of Trustees of the University of Ala-
bama v. Garrett"1 held that Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 2 which allowed disabled individuals to sue states for money dam-
ages for violation of equal protection rights, exceeded Congress's Section 5
power.7" The legislation at issue in Garrett suffered a similar fate to the Act
in Kimel. The Court held that Congress could not impose a heightened level
of scrutiny for disability discrimination, which has not been recognized as a
suspect classification. By rendering illegal a broad swath of state conduct 4
because of such individual's age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006). In 1974, Congress included
state governments in the definition of "employer." Kimel, 528 U.S. at 68.
6 Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
64 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
6- 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2000).
6 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 599 ("[T]he [Fourteenth] Amendment prohibits only state ac-
tion, not private conduct.").
6' The Violence Against Women Act of 1994 granted a federal civil remedy to victims of
gender-motivated violence. Subsection (c) provided that "[a] person (including a person who
acts under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State) who
commits a crime of violence motivated by gender ... shall be liable to the party injured ..
42 U.S.C. § 13981 (c) (2000).
68 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 620-24.
69 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
71 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 624-25.
71 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
7' Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. See also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (concerning Congress' power to craft legislation protect-
ing property rights).
74 The ADA included language prohibiting states and other employers from "dis-
criminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges
of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
2012]
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that exceeded what is constitutionally required under rational basis review, 75
the Court held that provisions of the ADA overstepped Congress's Section 5
authority.
B. Enforcing the Heart of Equal Protection
These recent changes in legal doctrine affecting congressional authority
have not limited Section 5 power to legislate in the important context of
fundamentally protected rights and the protection of suspect classifications.
Even in striking down the provision at issue in Kimel, the Court noted that
Congress retains broad authority under Section 5 "both to remedy and to
deter violation of rights guaranteed" under the Fourteenth Amendment "by
prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of conduct, including that which is
not itself forbidden by the Amendment's text."'76 In a more recent series of
cases that touched upon constitutional protections of fundamental rights and
suspect classifications, the Supreme Court upheld congressional enforce-
ment power.7 7
In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs,78 the Court found
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)79 involved an appropriate use of
congressional enforcement power pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause.'(
The FMLA created a private right of action for equitable and monetary relief
against state agencies and other employers who denied or interfered with
those rights guaranteed under the legislation.8' In applying the Boerne con-
gruence and proportionality test, the Court identified the constitutional right
at issue as the right "to be free from gender-based discrimination in the
workplace."82 The Court noted that gender-based classifications receive
heightened scrutiny under well-established Fourteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence. 3 It also likened the "difficult and intractable proble[m]" addressed
by the FMLA to the voting rights issues of Katzenbach v. Morgan.14 Ulti-
mately, the Court held the FMLA constituted sufficiently proportional pro-
7' Garrett, 531 U.S. at 372. As in Kinel, the Court highlighted the ADA's deficiencies by
referencing the 1965 Voting Rights Act at issue in Morgan. Id. at 373.
76 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) ("Congress' § 5 power is not
confined to the enactment of legislation that merely parrots the precise wording of the Four-
teenth Amendment.") (citation omitted).
77 See United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004); Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
78 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
79 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
8 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 724-27.
"' The family-care provision of the FMLA requires employers to provide employees with
up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave annually. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a)(1)(C) (2006). At issue
was whether an "individual [could] sue a State ... for violation of' the family-care provision.
Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 725.
12 Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 728.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 737 (citation omitted).
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phylactic legislation. It is worth noting that the remedies available under the
FMLA exceed those available under existing civil rights legislation. 5
One year after Hibbs, the Court in Tennessee v. Lane 6 upheld a require-
ment in Title II of the ADA that protected the fundamental right of access to
the courts.17 The Court's analysis in Lane is particularly enlightening as to
the question of congressional power. Like Garrett, the case examined the
constitutionality of provisions of the ADA. Yet, the Lane Court defined the
protected constitutional right at issue differently, and in doing so found Title
II of the ADA to be a valid exercise of congressional enforcement power. 8
Unlike Title I, Title II "seeks to enforce a variety of other basic constitu-
tional guarantees, infringements of which are subject to more searching judi-
cial review" than disability discrimination. 9 In defining the right at issue as
one that courts have repeatedly afforded greater judicial protection, the
Court appeared to give Congress wider berth to enact prophylactic
legislation.""
In referencing such historical treatment, 9' the Court noted that the con-
gressional record reflected "a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in
the administration of state services and programs, including systematic dep-
rivations of fundamental rights." 92 The Court, in recognizing the importance
of the right of access to the courts, found instances of discrimination across a
spectrum of activities beyond judicial administration.93 In addition, the
Court looked outside the four corners of the legislative record to find support
for the Act.94 In dicta, the Court also remarked that evidence of discrimina-
" Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act only prohibits discrimination in the administra-
tion of leave benefits but offers no method for preventing such discrimination. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a) (2006). See Hibbs, 538 U.S. at 737-38.816 541 U.S. 509 (2004)
" Id. at 533 (finding Title 11 of the ADA "a reasonable prophylactic measure, reasonably
targeted to a legitimate end").
88 Id.
89 Id. at 522-23 (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336-37 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Skinner v. Okla. ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942)).
90 /d. at 528-29 ("We explained [in Hibbs] that because the FMLA was targeted at sex-
based classifications, which are subject to a heightened standard of judicial scrutiny, it was
easier for Congress to show a pattern of state constitutional violations than in Garrett or Kinmel,
both of which concerned legislation that targeted classifications subject to rational-basis re-
view.") (internal quotations omitted).
' Id. at 523-24 (commenting that congressional enforcement authority is "judged with
reference to the historical experience which [Title II] reflects") (citing South Carolina v. Kat-
zenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966)).
92 Id. at 524.
The long history of unequal treatment of disabled persons in the administration ofjudicial services has persisted despite several state and federal legislative efforts to
remedy the problem. Faced with considerable evidence of the shortcomings of these
previous efforts, Congress was justified in concluding that the difficult and intracta-
ble problem of disability discrimination warranted added prophylactic measures.
Id. at 511(citing Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003)).
"I Id. at 527-29.
94 Id.
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tion need not be limited to state actors and may include actions by lower
level government entities9 and private actors.96 Finally, the Court noted that
Congress has authority to ban conduct that has a discriminatory impact, even
in the absence of evidence of a discriminatory motive.
In a powerful dissent in Lane, Justice Scalia stated that he believed the
Section 5 power should be confined to statutes that provided causes of action
for judicially articulated constitutional rules or that would directly facilitate
judicial enforcement."' With respect to legislation remedying racial discrim-
ination, however, Scalia announced he would apply a version of the relaxed
standard set forth in Katzenbach v. Morgan.99 Scalia attributed this reason-
ing to the Fourteenth Amendment's original concern for racial equality "" and
emphasized that any such legislation could not "violate other provisions" of
the Constitution.')
Of course, one may question what constitutes current evidence of racial
discrimination per Scalia's analysis. Race-conscious policies designed to
ameliorate persistent structural racial and social inequities in education may
not easily fit into Scalia's conception of valid Section 5 legislation in Lane.102
In his more recent concurrence in the employment case Ricci v. DeStef-
ano,13 Scalia suggested that some measures to reduce racial disparities may
not survive constitutional muster.11 4 In Ricci, the Court held that the city of
New Haven, Connecticut violated Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act's
ban on intentional discrimination by refusing to certify results of a firefighter
promotion examination after discovering that the process had a severely ad-
verse statistical impact on African-American firefighters." 5 Scalia noted the
seeming incongruity between the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits
the federal government "from discriminating on the basis of race," and dis-
I ld. at 527 n.16 ("[O]ur cases have recognized that evidence of constitutional violations
on the part of nonstate governmental actors is relevant to the § 5 inquiry.... [M]uch of the
evidence in South Carolina v. Katzenbach . . . involved the conduct of county and city offi-
cials, rather than the States.") (citation omitted).
"6 Id. (noting that "the evidence before the Congress that enacted the FMLA related pri-
marily to the practices of private-sector employers and the Federal Government" (citing Hibbs,
538 U.S. at 730-35)).
" Id. at 520 ("When Congress seeks to remedy or prevent unconstitutional discrimination,
§ 5 authorizes it to enact prophylactic legislation proscribing practices that are discriminatory
in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the basic objectives of the Equal Protection Clause.").
" Id. at 554-65 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
' 9 Id. at 561-63.
lO) Id.
101 Id. at 563-65.
102 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 346-49 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (discussing the affirmative action admission policy at issue).
103 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009).
104 Id. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Title VII's disparate-impact provisions place a
racial thumb on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their
policies, and to make decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes. That type of
racial decisionmaking is . . . discriminatory.").
1' Id. at 2677. The Court rejected the city's claim that its refusal to certify exam results
was mandated by Title VII's disparate impact doctrine, which prohibits the use of many written
tests with such disparate effects. Id. at 2664, 2673; see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2006).
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parate impact laws like Title VII that "mandat[e] that third parties-e.g.,
employers, whether private, State, or municipal-discriminate on the basis
of race."'" 6 Some have argued that Scalia's opinion in Ricci portends the
Court's dismantling of voluntary employer measures to remedy disparate im-
pact violations.1 7 Even if this were the case, broad voluntary measures to
foster racial inclusion in education may be distinguished. As Chief Justice
Roberts stated in the Ricci oral argument, the Parents Involved plurality and
concurrence agreed that some actions aimed at eliciting racial integration,
such as drawing attendance zone lines and strategic site selection, may not
trigger strict scrutiny, because they do not classify individual students on the
basis of race.""
III. CURRENT JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS AND LEGISLATIVE IMPERATIVES
In its examination of Section 5 power to protect fundamental rights and
suspect classes, the Court has continued to underscore Congress's substantial
authority. Hibbs and Lane suggest that to survive Boerne's congruence and
proportionality requirements, such legislation need not directly target adjudi-
cated constitutional violations. The FMLA at issue in Hibbs, for example,
provided remedies beyond existing civil rights legislation. 1°9 In Lane, the
Court found support for Title II of the ADA outside the legislative record
provided and in instances without evidence of a discriminatory motive. 1 It
is worth noting, however, that the wide latitude the majority afforded in
Hibbs and Lane may not be easily replicated given the changing composition
of the Court. Since 2004, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Samuel Alito,
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan have replaced Justices Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens, respectively; the former Justices all voted to
uphold the policies at issue in those cases."' While the replacement of Jus-
tices Souter and Stevens with Justices Sotomayor and Kagan may not por-
tend a jurisprudential shift, the addition of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Alito may augur more considerable changes. Roberts replaced Rehnquist,
the author of the majority opinion in Hibbs, and Alito replaced O'Connor,
the author of the majority opinion in Lane. In addition, while Justice Ken-
nedy offered hopeful language in his Parents Involved concurrence, he
joined the dissent in Lane and Hibbs. One could argue, however, that some
1"6 Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2682 (Scalia, J., concurring).
'See, e.g., Richard Primus, The Future of Disparate Impact, 108 MICH. L. Rvv. 1341,
1385 (2010) (noting Scalia's contention that "the war between disparate impact and equal
protection will be waged sooner or later, and it behooves us to begin thinking about how-and
on what terms-to make peace between them." (quoting Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2683 (Scalia, J.
concurring))).
"o8 Transcript of Oral Argument at 54, Ricci 129 S. Ct. 2658 (Nos. 07-1428, 08-328),
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/07-1428.pdf.
lo' Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 738 (2003).
" Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 519, 528-30 (2004).
. Justice Rehnquist did not, however, vote to uphold the policy at issue in Lane. See id.
at 538.
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of Kennedy's more recent jurisprudence suggests an evolving understanding
of issues of fundamental racial inequality and access to opportunity." 2 His
opinion in Parents Involved and his recent voting rights jurisprudence evince
a more nuanced awareness of structural racial inequities and the relevance of
racial identity and dynamics than in previous decisions." 3 Kennedy, with
the implicit endorsement of the four dissenting Justices, has clearly found a
compelling government interest in avoiding racial isolation in schools, re-
gardless of whether such isolation is the result of a discriminatory motive or
more complex structural inequities." 4 Moreover, he has called on the legis-
lative and executive branches to go forth and craft remedial policies.'" As
such, it is certainly possible that he could uphold Congress's authority to
craft carefully tailored legislation to address de facto racial segregation in
schools. I6
Since Boerne, the Court has not addressed the scope of congressional
enforcement power in areas that touch on fundamental racial inequality. In
2009, the Court considered congressional enforcement power under the Fif-
teenth Amendment to enact the Voting Rights Act of 1965," 7 but unani-
mously applied the principle of constitutional avoidance to refrain from
deciding whether the preclearance requirements of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act exceeded Congress's powers.'" In dicta, the Court referenced the
need identified in post-Boerne cases for legislation that is designed to ad-
dress recent patterns or practices of discrimination." 9 The Court suggested
that the Voting Rights Act raises serious constitutional concerns in that it
"imposes current burdens and must be justified by current needs."'' 2° The
ruling is instructive insofar as it hints at the level of evidence of contempo-
112 See supra Part I.
'' See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, Comment, Justice Kennedy and the Domains of Equal
Protection, 121 HARV. L. REv. 104 (2007) (discussing the evolution of Kennedy's equal pro-
tection jurisprudence in Parents Involved and League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006)). While Justice Kennedy has historically eschewed the use of race
in redistricting, he objected to the dismantling of a majority-minority district in LULAC on the
"rather remarkable ground that the Latinos mobilizing there 'had found an efficacious political
identity,"' id. at 105 (quoting LULAC, 548 U.S. at 435), which along with Kennedy's concur-
rence in Parents Involved supporting some race-conscious measures to alleviate racial isola-
tion in schools, "run directly contrary to Justice Kennedy's prior equal protection
jurisprudence," id. (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911-14 (1995); Grutter v. Bollin-
ger, 539 U.S. 306, 389 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)).
114 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 551 U.S. 701, 798 (2007) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
I1 d. at 789-90.
116 The likelihood of such legislation withstanding judicial review depends in large part on
its language and design. See infra Part IV.
"' Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504 (2009).
'l 8 Id. at 2513.
'
9 Id. at 2525.
120 Id.
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rary discrimination the Roberts Court may require to uphold congressional
enforcement legislation intruding upon state sovereignty.' 2
The aforementioned adjudicatory considerations of the reach of equal
protection indicate that carefully tailored race-conscious legislation to elimi-
nate racially isolated schools and address broad-based racial inequality in
educational opportunity may be well within the Supreme Court's construc-
tion of congressional enforcement power under Section 5. Proposed legisla-
tion may be designed as a constitutional response to address the educational
inequality facing racial minorities, which falls into the type of remedial leg-
islation for the protection of traditionally excluded groups that the Court is
more likely to uphold. Moreover, as discussed above, the nature of the leg-
islative branch is that it does not suffer from the same constraints as the
judiciary. As an institution, it is designed to gather facts from a broad range
of constituents across the nation, the very data that would be necessary to
develop appropriate remedial and prophylactic legislation addressing the
compelling interest in alleviating persistent racial isolation in education.
IV. STATUTORY DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
In the wake of narrowed judicial avenues to remedy the structural racial
inequality in education, Congress may be better situated to create a meaning-
ful response. First, Congress has a clear responsibility under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce racial equality. In addition, such re-
sponsibility is especially critical in the domain of education. 22 Given the
text, history, and structure of congressional enforcement power under Sec-
121 Interestingly, the lower court's opinion stresses that post-Boerne precedent dictates
"the greater the level of scrutiny and the stronger the record of [Fourteenth Amendment]
violations, the more deference Congress deserves in crafting enforcement schemes that may
'prohibit[ ] conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrude into legislative spheres of
autonomy previously reserved to the states.'" Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v.
Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 269 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507, 530 (1997)). As such, the court held that the 2006 legislative record reauthorizing the
Voting Rights Act provided sufficient evidence of contemporary discrimination to uphold the
legislation as a valid exercise of congressional enforcement power. Id. at 265.
122 It should be noted that Congress has passed a number of statutes that address the provi-
sion of education, which civil rights practitioners have used to advocate for racial equality in
education. For a discussion of the role of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in furthering
school integration, see Lia Epperson, Undercover Power: Examining the Role of the Executive
Branch in Determining the Meaning and Scope of School Integration Jurisprudence, 10
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL'Y 146 (2008). See also Epperson, Equality Dissonance,
supra note I (discussing No Child Left Behind; General Education Provision Act; Magnet
Schools Assistance Program; and Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, which offered funding
to help "eliminate[ ] racial segregation and discrimination" in elementary and secondary
schools, but ended with the passage of the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act under
President Ronald Reagan). For a discussion of the Emergency School Aid Act of 1972, see
GARY ORFELD, Desegregation and the Politics (4 Polarization, in CONGRESSIONAL POWER:
CONGRESS AND SOCIAl CHANGE 173 (1975). The fact remains, however, that Congress has not
passed broad-based legislation to effectuate the constitutional ideal of remedying de ftrcto ra-
cial isolation and segregation as outlined by Justice Kennedy in Parents Involved.
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tion 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress should have broad power to
establish national standards to protect basic educational rights and solve per-
sistent racial inequality. From a practical perspective, however, such poli-
cies might be strongest if designed with a keen awareness of judicially
defined limits on congressional enforcement power. Statutory design helps
determine the probability of such legislation withstanding judicial scrutiny.
The principles of flexibility and fostering local choice in creating remedies
should guide the creation of statutory language to ameliorate racial inequal-
ity and promote racial inclusion in public education.
To stand on the strongest footing, proposed legislation at the intersec-
tion of racial equality and education should be designed with an understand-
ing of the Supreme Court's narrower "congruence and proportionality" test
set forth in Boerne.23 To craft legislation that comports with the Boerne
requirement of congruence and proportionality, legislators may need to
clearly define the remedial and/or prophylactic purpose of the statute. If the
statute's purpose is to remedy existing racial isolation and avoid continuing
isolation, the legislation will be well within the definition of constitutionally
authorized remedial or prophylactic legislation. 2 4 Yet, the question of how
far such legislation should go in reaching this goal raises more complicated
statutory questions. For example, such legislation may provide constitu-
tional protection for ongoing voluntary integration efforts by school districts
like Jefferson County, Kentucky, a district committed to creatively working
to eliminate racial isolation even in the wake of the Supreme Court's deci-
sion striking down its previous policy. In addition, legislation might go fur-
ther and articulate a broad directive to prod recalcitrant, less informed, or
less aware districts to follow suit and begin to craft measures to foster racial
integration.
This article does not purport to answer all of the questions raised by
suggesting that Section 5 serve as the vehicle for federal legislation address-
ing defacto racial segregation in education. Rather, I offer some broad sug-
gestions for ways in which lawmakers might conceive of maximizing the
potential of a federal legislative structure aimed at ameliorating racial isola-
tion and inequality in education. Such suggestions focus on three substan-
tive areas: (1) the use of statutory language mirroring integration language
in the fair housing context; (2) data collection to support legislation and to
123 The Boerne test requires courts to (1) identify the scope of the constitutional right at
issue, and the appropriate level of judicial scrutiny for the right that Congress aims to enforce;
(2) examine the wrong that Congress intended to remedy; and (3) determine whether the legis-
lation to remedy and prevent violations of the protected right is congruent and proportional to
the record Congress developed and to the risk of future constitutional harm. City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529-34 (1997).
124 Note that some successful bipartisan legislation was enacted as consciously "correc-
tive" civil rights legislation. See, e.g., Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2,
123 Stat. 5 (2009); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (enacted to
change Supreme Court rulings on employment discrimination).
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provide information on successful models of racially integrated education;
and (3) implementing such legislation through a principle of shared burden.
A. Coupling the Fair Housing Analogy With Clear
Enforcement Mechanisms
The aforementioned concerns regarding statutory language suggest that
congressional efforts to further racial inclusion may be on stronger footing
when such legislation does not require students to be individually classified
by race or ethnicity. The context of fair housing provides an interesting
model. The Fair Housing Act of 1968125 requires federal government agen-
cies and the programs and activities they fund to be operated in a manner
that affirmatively furthers fair housing. 26 Federal courts have repeatedly
held that § 3608 reflects a congressional "desire to have [the U.S. Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)] use its grant programs to
assist in ending discrimination and segregation .... ,,127 Section 3608 im-
poses an affirmative obligation on HUD and its grantees to ensure that fed-
eral housing and community development funds are used to reduce rather
than perpetuate racial segregation. 12 In fact, courts have held that in deter-
mining site selection of new schools or attendance zone lines, "[HUD can-
not] remain blind to the very real effect that racial concentration has had in
the development of urban blight ... [and] must utilize some institutional-
ized method whereby, in considering site selection or type selection, it has
before it the relevant racial and socio-economic information necessary for
compliance with its duties under the 1964 and 1968 Civil Rights Acts."'12 9
Interestingly, congressional language affirmatively furthering fair housing
has been one of the few race-conscious policies to remain relatively un-
scathed in the more recent proliferation of "reverse discrimination" lawsuits
in the domains of education, public contracting, employment, and voting
rights. 3 Rather, in recent litigation, section 3608 has provided a mechanism
to address entrenched residential segregation and provide a legal hook for
promoting racially inclusive housing opportunities. 3'
Language in the education context might read as follows: Within the
limitations set forth by the Constitution, this Act shall require states to af-
125 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006).
126 Id. at § 3608(d).
127 NAACP v. Sec'y of Hous. and Urban Dev., 817 F.2d 149, 155 (1st Cir. 1987).
1
28 See Otero v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122, 1134 (2d Cir. 1973).
129 Shannon v. HUD, 436 F.2d 809, 820-21 (3d Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the legis-
lative history, interpretation, and application of Section 3608, see Florence Wagman Roisman,
Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing in Regional Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public
Housing Desegregation Litigation, 42 WAKE FoiEsi L. REv. 333 (2007) (discussing Thomp-
son v. HUD, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398, 461 (D. Md. 2005)).
"') See Philip Tegeler, The Future 9/ Race-Conscious Goals in National Housing Policy, in
PUBLIC HOUSING AND IHE LEGACY OF SEGIREGATION 145-69 (Margery Austin Turner et al.
eds., 2009).
"' See, e.g., United States ex rel. Anti-Discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. West-
chester Cnty., 668 F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d 398.
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firmatively further the compelling government interest in alleviating racial
isolation in the provision of public education. While requiring states to "af-
firmatively further" racially integrated education is a worthy goal, it will
need strong enforcement language to work effectively. In addition, clear
statutory language conferring rulemaking and regulatory authority to an ad-
ministrative agency may help insulate legislation from judicial attack. 112
Such enforcement, I suggest, should go beyond requiring integrative efforts
as a precondition of the receipt of federal funds by states. Rather, such leg-
islation should explicitly include a private right of action for parties to sue
for equitable relief if states fail to take measures to affirmatively reduce
racial isolation in schools.'33 Corrective legislation addressing the ability of
private parties to bring claims offers an important means of ensuring those
" 2 In Smith v. City ofJackson, for example, Justice Scalia deferred to agency interpreta-
tion of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 544 U.S. 228, 243 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) ("This is an absolutely classic case for deference to agency interpretation. The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ... confers upon the [Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission] authority to issue such rules and regulations as it may consider necessary or
appropriate for carrying out the ADEA.") (citations and quotations omitted).
113 Since the Court's 1995 decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (hold-
ing that Congress could not use its Article I powers to subject states to suit in federal court
absent the states' consent), the Court has used the Eleventh Amendment to limit the reach of
federal civil rights laws. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that Con-
gress could not use its Article I powers to subject states to private suits in their own courts); Fl.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (Congress'
explicit abrogation of states' sovereign immunity under the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act and the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act exceeded its Section 5
authority). Under the text of the Eleventh Amendment, "[t]he Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONs r. amend. XI. While such decisions have hindered the ability to sue
states for money damages absent a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 authority, such limi-
tations have not hindered the ability of individuals to seek equitable relief from state officials
in other ways. For a discussion, see, e.g., John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise (f the Eleventh
Amendment and Section 1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47 (1998); John C. Jeffries, Jr., The Right-
Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87 (1999); Henry Paul Monaghan, Com-
ment, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REv. 102 (1996). Specifically,
absent valid Section 5 legislation abrogating state sovereign immunity, private individuals may
still sue state officials either under the fiction for injunctive relief, see Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), or under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006), which provides, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Professor Pamela Karlan has noted that "a key consequence" of the state's Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity is that it limits the "possibility of an adequate damages remedy for the in-
tended beneficiaries of congressional regulation . . . [and] creates the potential for an
irreparable injury ... precisely the circumstance that justifies injunctive relief under both Ex
parte Young and § 1983." Pamela S. Karlan, The Irony of Immunity: The Eleventh Amend-
ment, Irreparable InJury, and Section 1983, 53 STAN. L. Rrv. 1311, 1314 (2001). Such in-
junctive relief "may turn out to be far broader and more intrusive than the damages that would
have been available after the fact." Id.
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who have been harmed by persistent racial isolation have meaningful consti-
tutional protection. 13 4 Such a statutory scheme should work in conjunction
with existing civil rights legislation under Titles IV and VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. As Title VI has done, the proposed scheme could empower an
administrative body such as the Office for Civil Rights in the Department of
Education or an independent agency directed by a career employee, rather
than a political appointee, to provide federal oversight and enforcement.
This body could investigate and resolve complaints. Moreover, legislation
could authorize action by the Department of Justice for those states that re-
fuse compliance. Language might also allow for liability on the part of the
Department of Education if the Department knows of states' failure to com-
ply and has made no effort to require compliance.
B. Data Collection: Creating a Legislative Record and a
National Repository
Any proposed legislation to address structural racial inequality in edu-
cation should include deliberations that both document the current racial in-
equities in educational opportunity and provide useful data that may assist
states and localities in fostering racially inclusive educational opportunities.
The post-Boerne decisions striking down congressional enforcement legisla-
tion stressed the critical role of congressional fact-finding in safeguarding
legislation from judicial scrutiny. 35 In Garrett, for example, the Rehnquist
Court struck down the application of a provision of the ADA to state actors
in part due to insufficient legislative findings. 116 Rather than assuming the
existence of state discrimination against disabled persons, the Court held that
Congress must first "identif[y] a history and pattern of unconstitutional
state transgressions."3' Similarly, in Kimel, the Court stressed the impor-
"' See Pamela S. Karlan, Disarming the Private Attorney General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV.
183 (2003). Such language should be explicitly stated in unequivocal "rights creating" lan-
guage. This would then resolve the problem the Supreme Court found in Alexander v. Sando-
val, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001) (holding Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not create
a private right of action for individuals to sue states for violations).
... Of course, jurisprudential emphasis on congressional fact-finding for support of Sec-
tion 5 legislation began long before Boerne. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, the court relied on
congressional fact-finding to establish congressional authority to employ Section 5 to set aside
New York's literacy requirement. 384 U.S. 641, 654-55 (1966) (writing that Congress might
have determined that "prejudice played a prominent role in the enactment of the require-
ment.... Congress undertook to legislate.., and did so in the context of a general appraisal of
literacy requirements for voting to which it brought a specially informed legislative compe-
tence.") (citations omitted).
I36 Bd. of Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 358 (2001).
Id. at 368; see also id. at 368-70. Scholars have raised the point that it is not entirely
clear what constitutes a legislative finding of "state transgressions" for purposes of upholding
Section 5 legislation. See, e.g., Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism
and Section 5 Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112
YALE L.J. 1943, 1968 (2003) (noting that judicial interpretations of substantive constitutional
rights are inextricably linked to the "procedural context of adjudication," making it difficult to
interpret them in a legislative context).
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tance of a strong evidentiary record supporting the legislation.138 The Court
found a constitutional right to enact enforcement legislation prohibiting age
discrimination only if Congress can identify "any pattern of age discrimina-
tion by the States" that reaches "the level of a constitutional violation."13 9
According to dicta in Lane, such findings need not be limited to state dis-
crimination and may include evidence of private party conduct. 14°
When congressional enforcement legislation protects suspect classes or
a fundamental right, however, the Court has held that such deliberations
need not take the form of formal congressional hearings from which findings
are officially compiled. Rather, Congress may create a task force that is
charged with receiving and compiling evidence on racial isolation and ine-
quality in education. The Supreme Court has accepted such evidence as
valid congressional findings when reviewing and upholding congressional
enforcement legislation in the wake of Boerne.141
Ultimately, Congress may serve a key function by creating and housing
a national repository of critical data on the pervasiveness and permutations
of racial and socioeconomic segregation in public education. By providing
examples of successful integration policies that have been used in school
districts throughout the country, such a repository may turn out to be one of
the most helpful and least controversial aspects of fostering racial inclusion
in public education. An interesting analogy may be the use of racial dispar-
ity studies in the public contracting context. In the wake of the 1989 Su-
preme Court decision in Richmond v. Croson,142 striking down Richmond,
Virginia's affirmative action policy in public contracting, various state and
local governments as well as the United States Commission for Civil Rights
have commissioned studies to document continued racial disparities in pub-
lic employment and contracting.4 3 Such studies help to satisfy the Court's
requirement that existing race-conscious policies in public employment and
contracting remedy the present effects of past, particularized discrimination
in specific geographic regions and industries. 44
In this vein, one could also look to the fair housing context for a model
to address some of the evidentiary considerations. The components of "af-
firmatively furthering" fair housing legislation that may be replicated in the
education context include (1) conducting analysis to identify the impedi-
ments to racially integrated education within jurisdictions; (2) taking appro-
priate actions to overcome the effects of the impediments identified through
S See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000).
1 Id.
4
"See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 527 n.16 (2004).
... See id. at 527 (citing TASK FORCE ON THE RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS
wrH DISABLrIIS, FROM ADA io EMPOWERMENI: THE REPORT OF HILE TASK FORCE ON 111E
RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF AMERICANS WITH DISABH Trms (1990)).
.42 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
'41 See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CivL RIGHIS, DISPARITY STUDIES AS EVIDENCE OF
DISCRIMINATION IN FEDERAL CONTRACTING (2006).
'" See, e.g., JON S. WAINWRIGHI, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND MINORIY BUSINESS EN
TERPRISE (2000).
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analysis; and (3) maintaining records reflecting analysis and actions taken in
this regard. 145 Such a model led to the settlement of litigation in Westchester
County, New York, where HUD alleged that the County failed to affirma-
tively further fair housing by concentrating government-funded housing de-
velopments in low-income and minority communities. 4 Under the
settlement negotiation, the County must build affordable housing in more
affluent areas.
41
Moreover, such data collection serves the key function of elucidating
the benefits of racially integrated education. Social science evidence sup-
porting racial integration in education has detailed the democracy-reinforc-
ing benefits of racially integrated educational environments. 48  This
evidence can be helpful in researching and documenting effective integration
policies at the federal level. Data collection should include evidence of crea-
tive racially inclusive policies that have been successfully used by districts.
A number of school districts throughout the country have created or main-
tained policies aimed at fostering racial and socioeconomic diversity in
schools. 149 Jefferson County, Kentucky, which encompasses the city of Lou-
isville, still considers income, place of residence, and race and ethnicity
when assigning students to schools; however, its consideration of race is
"global," in that it eschews individual classification in favor of census tract
data. 5 In northern California, the Berkeley Unified School District consid-
ers several variables in granting school choice, including race, socioeco-
nomic status, geography, and linguistics. 5' Again, the Berkeley example
uses global policies that do not allocate benefits and burdens on the basis of
individual racial classification. 5 2 Such examples show that there are com-
' Federal capacity to review and analyze such data in the education context may be
enhanced by working with nonprofit education groups nationally.
146 See U.S. ex rel. Antidiscrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester Cnty., 688
F. Supp. 2d 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
' Press Release, Anti-Discrimination Center, Inc., Anti-Discrimination Center Wins Un-
precedented $62.5 Million Settlement in Housing De-Segregation Case Against Westchester
County (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.antibiaslaw.com/sites/default/files/files/ADCrelease2009
0810.pdf (on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
148 See, e.g., AMY SIUARL WELLS ET AL., BOTH SIDES Now: THE STORY OF SCHOOL
DESEuIEGN1 AION's GRADUAIES (2009); Amy Stuart Wells & Robert L. Crain, Perpetuation
Theory and the Long-Term Effects of School Desegregation, 64 REv. EDUC. RES. 531, 552
(1994); Janet W. Schofield, School Desegregation and Intergroup Relations, A Review oJ the
Literature, 17 REv. EDUC. RES. 335, 339 (1991).
141 See Susan Eaton, Diversity's Quiet Rebirth, EDUC. WEEK, Aug. 18, 2008 (detailing
programs implemented in Boston, Massachusetts; Hartford, Connecticut; Milwaukee, Wiscon-
sin; and Palo Alto, California, that facilitate student transfers between urban schools, with
higher concentrations of poverty and a higher population of students of color, and whiter,
wealthier suburban schools). See also AMY STUART WEiLS ET AT., BOUNDARY CROSSING FOR
DIVERSITY, EQUITY, AND ACIEVEMENT: INTER-DISTRICT ScHool DESEGREGATION AND EDU-
CATIONAL OPPORIUNITY (2009).
"O Eaton, supra note 149.
'"See, e.g., LISA CHAVEZ & ERICA FRANKENBERG, INTEGRATION DEFENDED: BERKELEY
UNIFIED'S SIRAIEGY TO MAINLAIN SCHOOL DIVERSILY (2009).
" See id.
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munities who desire the ability to implement integration plans, so it is im-
perative to find avenues of support for such efforts.
Congressional legislation should also fund research, development, and
policy replication to preserve and strengthen federal, state, and local efforts
to protect equal access to educational opportunities. Such funding would
include providing technical assistance to localities devising programs to alle-
viate racial disparities, which would allow flexibility in fashioning the best
remedies for a particular locale. Recently, Congress began funding demon-
stration projects in a number of school districts. 53 Funding for research and
replication grants could further be utilized to assist those districts with the
most persistent racial isolation and largest disparity issues. In addition,
grants might fund research that will show best practices in reducing racial
isolation and disparities. Such funding for research and development could
help fuel improvement by facilitating the replication of successful programs.
Indeed, a critical role of federal legislative involvement in this arena is to
educate the public and facilitate flexible, holistic, and varied race-conscious
and race-neutral measures. The benefit of proposed replication grants is that
such grants may encourage school diversity by helping those districts that
voluntarily adopt carefully tailored race-conscious measures to promote the
educational, social, and democratic benefits of racially and ethnically diverse
classrooms. The aim would be to allow local discretion in collaborating to
determine optimal ways to increase racial inclusion in local school districts.
As such, legislation should give jurisdictions the flexibility to choose one
mode of inclusion over another. This would allow for more nuanced and
holistic ways of operating effectively.
In addition, such legislation should take account of the increased politi-
cal feasibility of "global" policies designed to foster racial inclusion while
refraining from classifying or assigning individual students on the basis of
their race. For example, in his pivotal concurrence in Parents Involved, Jus-
tice Kennedy talked about the necessity of race-conscious measures to alle-
viate racial isolation and proffered generalized race-conscious policy options
that do not categorize individual students based on race.5 4 Significantly,
Kennedy eschewed individualized racial classifications, even though they
have been the mainstay remedy for de jure segregation.' Kennedy champi-
oned policies that may be neutral on their face, though developed out of a
desire to increase racial inclusion.5 6 These included strategic site selection
of new schools, targeted student and faculty recruitment, and drawing at-
tendance zone lines to maximize racial integration.5 7 Kennedy reasoned
that such facially neutral, racially motivated plans may not even trigger strict
"' See, e.g., 34 CFR §§ 74, 75, 77, 79-82, 84, 85, 97-99 (2011); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000c,
2000c-2, 2000c-5 (2006); U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., TYCHNICAL ASSISTANCE FOR STUDENT ASSIGN-
MENT PLANS: PURPOSE, available at http://www.ed.gov/programs/tasap/index.html.
154 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 787-88
(2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
155 See id. at 794-95.
156 See id. at 788-89.
"'See id. at 789.
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scrutiny. 58  Legislation that calls for "race-conscious," "race-neutral," or
"facially neutral yet racially motivated" measures or uses race on a "global"
level, while refraining from individualized racial classifications, has tremen-
dous import for purposes of constitutional endurance.5 9 Moreover, Con-
gress may cull evidence to support the use of additional race-conscious
measures over measures that are facially neutral.
C. Furthering a Principle of Shared Burden
Such proposed legislation should also further the principle of "shared
burden"-combining flexibility and choice to maximize benefits and de-
crease burdens for all. For example, models that foster increased racial and
economic integration between city and suburban districts may include struc-
tures to minimize inner-city fiscal burdens and potential overcrowding in
suburban schools. Policies might include the provision of transportation and
construction funding to suburban schools, while also increasing magnet
school funding for inner-city schools."') Such programs work best when im-
plemented in the earliest years of education. The flexibility of these pro-
grams might include increased funding for transportation and creation of
experimental districts. Obviously, there are myriad considerations regarding
the scope of legislation of this kind. For instance, placing a premium on
choice and flexibility in this context may raise concerns regarding the effec-
tiveness of the proposed requirements. In addition, specific attention to ra-
cial, socioeconomic and spatial characteristics of school districts and regions
is critical to facilitating truly effective reform. The key factor in such policy
considerations is grounding them in the tenets of structural disparities rather
than focusing on intentional racial discrimination. In this vein, one might
look to examples of existing measures used to identify sources of intractable
racial inequality and lack of opportunity. Such examples include "racial
impact statements" conducted by some state governments prior to engaging
in new construction projects or social initiatives. Similar to fiscal and envi-
ronmental impact statements, such assessments are viewed as responsible
measures to minimize the burden of new initiatives.' 6'
158 Id.
"' There may be constitutional questions raised about "facially neutral but racially moti-
vated" legislation under the Supreme Court's standard articulated in Washington v. Davis. 426
U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976) (eliminating disparate impact causes of action under equal protection
guarantees of the Constitution).
160 See generally AMY STUART WF s& ROBYRT L. CRAIN, STEPPING OVYR THE COLOR
LINE: AFidCAN-AMERICAN STUDENTS IN WHITE SLBLRBAN SCHOOLS (1997) (detailing the suc-
cess of and bipartisan support for a St. Louis, Missouri, voluntary urban-suburban integration
plan, due in part to a funding boost).
161 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 2-24b (2011); IOWA CoDE ANN. § 2.56 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
Given its unique position in our national landscape, it is no wonder that
scholars have long argued about the essential role of Congress in constitu-
tional interpretations of civil rights norms. The complicated tapestry of sys-
temic racial, economic, and demographic factors that have contributed to
sustained racial isolation in education necessitate effective and nuanced so-
lutions that emanate from policy reform rather than court-ordered redress.
Congressional enforcement power is, at its core, a mechanism for ensuring
that the promise of equality is realized for all. One of the more hopeful and
substantive paths for addressing racial segregation and isolation in American
schools and their attendant inequities may be in capitalizing on Congress's
significant enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to consciously create a remedy for twenty-first century structural ills.
